PIPER CONSIDERS COMPLIANCE MANDATORY
This is a truncated version of the service bulletin for a copy of the complete service bulletin, download the attachment below:
Service Bulletin (SB) 1375C supersedes SB 1375, SB 1375A, and SB 1375B in their entirety. If any of the four factory original screws in the upper flange were replaced with oversize fasteners as part of compliance with SB1375A, contact Piper for disposition. Aircraft that have complied with SB 1375B are in compliance with SB 1375C.
WARNING: SB 1375A SPECIFIED INCORRECT REPLACEMENT SCREWS FOR THE UPPER FLANGE. ACCORDINGLY, IF ANY OF THE FOUR FACTORY ORIGINAL SCREWS IN THE UPPER FLANGE WERE REPLACED WITH OVERSIZE FASTENERS AS PART OF COMPLIANCE WITH SB1375A, THE AIRCRAFT MAY NO LONGER BE AIRWORTHY, CONTACT PIPER FOR DISPOSITION.
SUBJECT: periodic replacement of main landing gear attachment hardware
REASON FOR REVISION: SB 1375C revises the instructions for clarity and corrections.
MODELS and serial numbers affected:
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2023-0172; Project Identifier AD-2023-00265-E; Amendment 39-22355; AD 2023-04-08]
Airworthiness Directives; Continental Aerospace Technologies, Inc. ReciprocatingEngines
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
Final rule; request for comments.
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Continental AerospaceTechnologies, Inc. (Continental) GTSIO-520-C, -D, -H, -K, -L, -M, -N, and -S; IO-360-A, -AB, -AF, -C,-CB, -D, -DB, -E, -ES, -G, -GB, -H, -HB, -J, -JB, -K, and -KB; IO-470-D, -E, -G, -H, -J, -K, -L, -M, -N, -P, -R, -S, -T, -U, -V, and -VO; IO-520-A, -B, -BA, -BB, -C, -CB, -D, -E, -F, -J, -K, -L, -M, and -MB; IO-550-A, -B, -C, -D, -E, -F, -G, -L, -N, -P, and -R; LTSIO-360-E, -EB, -KB, and -RB; LTSIO-520-AE; O-470-A, -B, -E, -G, -H, -J, -K, -L, -M, -N, -R, -S, -T, and -U; TSIO-360-A, -AB, -B, -BB, -C, -CB, -D, -DB,-E, -EB, -G, -GB, -H, -HB, -JB, -KB, -LB, -MB, -RB, and -SB; TSIO-520-A, -AE, -AF, -B, -BB, -BE, -C, -CE, -D, -DB, -E, -EB, -G, -H, -J, -JB, -K, -KB, -L, -LB, -M, -NB, -P, -R, -T, -UB, -VB, and -WB; TSIO-550-A, -B, -C, -E, -G, -K, and -N; TSIOF-550-K; and TSIOL-550-A, -B, and -C model reciprocatingengines. This AD was prompted by a report of a quality escape involving improper installation of counterweight retaining rings in the engine crankshaft counterweight groove during manufacture. This AD requires inspection of the crankshaft assembly for proper installation of the counterweight retaining rings in the counterweight groove, and corrective actions if improper installation is found. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
Click here for complete AD: https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/FR-ADFRAWD-2023-03796-0000000000.0001
Since the FAA issued AD 2023-04-08, the FAA determined that IO-470-A, -C, -F, and -LO; and TSIO-360-F and -FB model engines are also affected by the unsafe condition and should be added to the applicability.
Additionally, the FAA determined that the limitations in the special flight permit paragraph, specifying “no metal contamination in the oil filter”, did not account for trace metal particles that may be found in newer engines due to break-in of the engine.
AD 2023-05-16 supersedes AD 2023-04-08.
If you have fully complied with AD 2023-04-08 prior to the effective date of AD 2023-05-16 your compliance is accounted for in paragraph (f) of the AD and you are not required to re-perform the required action. Record compliance accordingly.
AD 2023-05-16 did not change the required action paragraph to what is found in AD 2023-04-08.
AD 2023-05-16 is effective upon publication.
SUBJ: Wing Spar
Date: October 19, 2022
This is information only. Recommendations aren’t mandatory.
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts all owners, operators, maintenance technicians, and inspectors of Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) PA-28 and PA-32 airplanes of information gathered as a result of a fatal accident of a Piper Model PA-28R-201 airplane in 2018 and the inspection findings that followed. The accident, determined to be caused by fatigue cracks in the lower spar cap, resulted in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issuing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-26-16, which requires several actions including a one-time inspection of certain lower spar cap bolt holes. AD 2020-26-16 was issued as an interim action and requires reporting certain inspection information to the FAA to help determine the number of cracks present in the fleet. The inspection reports received by the FAA thus far indicate the presence of numerous cracks and hole-quality issues in a significant number of airplanes.